Merrie Hoover Abbott

Merrie Hoover Abbott was elected as prosecuting attorney of Ogemaw County, Michigan in 1898. Abbott was a lawyer in practice with her husband. After her election Attorney-General Horace M. Oren brought proceedings to test Abbott's right to the office. The Michigan State Supreme Court found that only electors were eligible to hold elected office. Merrie Abbott left office in 1899 after the Supreme Court decision. Charles S. Abbott, Allen S. Morse and T. A. E. Weadock were the advocates for Mrs. Abbott, and she also made a strong oral argument in her own behalf. Unfortunately the case was not one which permitted an appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court. In the autumn of 1898 Mrs. Merrie Hoover Abbott, law-partner in the firm of Abbott & Abbott of West Branch, was nominated on the Democratic ticket as prosecuting attorney of Ogemaw County. She was elected and entered upon her duties Jan. 1, 1899. Quo warranto proceedings were instituted by Attorney-General Horace M. Oren to test her right to the office, and October 17 the Supreme Court filed its opinion and entered judgment of ouster. In the meantime Mrs. Abbott had discharged successfully the duties of the position. The opinion was as follows "Where the constitution in creating a public office is silent in regard to qualification to office, electors only are qualified to fill the same, and since under the constitution women are not electors, they are not eligible to hold such offices. The office of prosecuting attorney is a constitutional office which can only be held by one possessing the qualification of an elector." From this opinion Justice Joseph B. Moore dissented, making an able argument. In closing he said:The statutes of this State confer upon woman the right to practice law. She may represent her client in the most important litigation in all the courts, and no one can dispute her right. She may defend a person charged with murder. Can she not prosecute one charged with the larceny of a whip? To say she can not seems illogical. . . . . Individuals may employ her and the courts must recognize her employment. If the people see fit, by electing her to an office the duties of which pertain almost wholly to the practice of the law, to employ her to represent them in their litigation, [pp. 771] why should not the courts recognize the employment? . . . . Where the constitution and the statutes are silent as to the qualification for a given office, the people may elect whom they will, if the person so elected is competent to discharge the duties of the office. . . . . None of the duties of prosecuting attorney are of such a character as to preclude one from their performance simply because of sex.